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Reviewed by Robert Fredona 
 
Representatives of all nations gather for the utility of mankind; there, the Jew, the Mohammedan, 
and the Christian behave towards each other as if they were of the same religion, and reserve the 
word “infidel” for those who go bankrupt. 
—Voltaire, letter VI, Lettres Philosophiques (1734) 
 
Voltaire’s words about the London Royal Exchange, quoted by Francesca Trivellato in her 
important new book The Promise and Peril of Credit, represent pars pro toto a view of finance 
and trade—as peaceful, tolerant, antagonistic to the old segregations and brutalities of religion, 
and ultimately emancipatory—that entered the philosophical mainstream in the eighteenth century, 
that seems to at least partly form the foundations of liberal modernity, and that continues to shape 
the way we think about business and capitalism today (p. 139). Yet Voltaire himself was an anti-
Semite who obsessed about the Jews and trafficked in old clichés about cunning Jewish merchants 
precisely in order to make his case for commerce as a vehicle of toleration. This and similar ironies 
or contradictions lie at the heart of Promise and Peril, which traces from the mid-seventeenth to 
the mid-twentieth century what Trivellato calls a “legend,” because it is both patently false (we 
now know), and was once widespread, that Jews in the Middle Ages or Renaissance invented the 
bill of exchange (and sometimes also marine insurance). 
Before the creation of actuarial models of risk, the “mathematics” of marine insurance 
relied on experience, intuition, and expertise—on underwriters having special “knowledge of 
vessels, captains, routes, wars, piracy, and other elements affecting the likelihood of an accident 
at sea” (p. 22). More problematic still was the most sophisticated credit instrument of early 
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modernity, the bill of exchange. For Trivellato, bills of exchange—“arcane,” “enigmatic,” 
“cryptic,” and “intangible” financial instruments—“epitomized the promise and peril of early 
modern commercial credit” (p. 2). They were highly technical, coded, long-distance credit 
contracts not found in Roman law, not founded on any collateral or real security (unlike marine 
insurance), and simultaneously a means both of currency exchange and, since they were 
transferable and discountable, of exchange rate and credit market speculation. Backing a bill of 
exchange was nothing more or less than the presumed solvency of the bill’s far-flung signatories. 
And, as such, behind each bill of exchange “lay a highly personalized, if no longer face-to-face, 
market in which dense networks of epistolary correspondents marshaled the information necessary 
to evaluate an endorser’s credibility” (p. 34). 
The word “credit” derives from the Latin verb for trusting (credere), and knowing whom 
to trust was a matter of vital concern in the world of early modern European commerce. This world 
was one of disconnected and dispersed communities, like the Sephardic merchants of Venice and 
Amsterdam, or those of the Tuscan free port of Livorno, who were the subject of Trivellato’s major 
2009 study, The Familiarity of Strangers. The segmented nature of these trading and financial 
communities (associated with ethnic, religious, and civic or national identities) meant that, 
especially in the increasing absence of close business or personal relationships, without modern 
information and verification technologies, and, importantly, without modern notions of equality, 
it was appealing (perhaps even rational) to have recourse to collective stereotypes when assessing, 
for example, the creditworthiness of potential debtors. Such stereotypes informed not only the ad 
hoc judgments of merchants, but also the legislative decisions of statesmen and princes, which set 
different “parameters of public action” for different merchant communities (p. 12). This state of 
affairs allows Trivellato to collapse the distinction, sometimes starkly drawn by historians and 
critical theorists, between “representation” and “practice,” between, in this case, the stereotypical 
image of the Jewish merchant and the way commercial transactions were actually facilitated, if not 
the structural conditions of preindustrial money and credit markets themselves. 
What did it mean, in such a context, Trivellato asks, for Jews to be stereotypically 
associated both with perfidia (faithlessness or untrustworthiness) and with extravagant 
commercial acumen? To have two such seemingly incompatible reputations? Anti-Semitic tropes 
were rampant in many early modern Christian genres, from sermons to political broadsides, but 
the “legend” at the heart of Trivellato’s book somehow thrived, counterintuitively, in a burgeoning 
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and diverse mercantile literature meant to lionize commerce and, sometimes, to quell unease about 
its broadening financialization. Cui bono? What would the authors of such a literature gain from 
associating the bill of exchange, the essential (and already anxiety-producing) instrument of that 
financialization, which formed the foundation of the international credit market, with Jews? It is 
precisely the deep disconsonances within the stereotype about Jewish merchants (at once 
perfidious and hypercompetent), Trivellato argues, that kept “the legend” alive into the early 
twentieth century. “Negative group stereotypes,” she further notes, “tend to be remarkably 
impermeable to reality, even as they possess a striking ability to conjure new meanings out of a 
finite repertoire”. And this dual feature of the “legend” allowed it, in the hands of mercantile 
writers, to become “a substitute for hard-to-define normative criteria for the rightful handling of 
bills of exchange” (p. 13). There was, to put it bluntly, a right way to use and trade in bills of 
exchange and then there was the Jewish way. “By recourse to the old trope of Jewish deceit,” 
Trivellato writes, the “legend,” which relied at the same time on a trope of Jewish mercantile 
acumen, “articulated concerns about the morality of credit that were very real and yet difficult to 
pin down” (p. 35). 
In the middle of the seventeenth century, as France was entering the arena of European 
maritime expansion in full force, the port city of Bordeaux was growing into a major hub of the 
Atlantic trade and its economically dynamic Jewish population (perhaps 2 percent of the whole) 
was growing ever more visible. The descendants of forcibly baptized Portuguese Jews, they were 
living not openly as Jews but as “New Christians,” tolerated and even protected by local and royal 
authorities for economic reasons, yet feared by some rival merchants and by Bordeaux’s much 
larger gentile population. Just as the Roman church suspected these “New Christians” were crypto-
Jews, continuing to follow Jewish law in a mockery of the sacrament of baptism, the wider 
Christian world was gripped by the fear that Jews were becoming indistinguishable from 
Christians. In Bordeaux, as Trivellato writes, “they walked the same docks as other merchants and 
sat in the same church pews as other Catholics” (p. 84). In this way, crypto-Judaism in Bordeaux 
aggravated a long-term “crisis of legibility in the boundaries separating Jews and Christians,” one 
that had erupted more than a century and a half earlier (p. 95). And to this preoccupation, telling 
Jews and Christians apart, the increasingly impersonal markets of the sixteenth century in which 
guilds were losing ground as reputational gatekeepers added yet another, telling good and bad 
debtors and good and bad credit instruments apart. 
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It was amid these overlapping contexts that the “legend” first emerged in print, in a 
publishing success called the Us et coustumes de la mer (1647; expanded edition, 1661), a 
comprehensive collection of maritime laws and norms assembled by Étienne Cleirac (d. 1657), a 
Catholic and monarchist with a background in Roman law who was dedicated to conferring 
respectability upon the fils de Neptune, those sailors and merchants who made their living or their 
fortunes from navigation and maritime commerce. Cleirac provided idiosyncratic (sometimes 
muddled and error laden but often compelling) commentaries alongside the norms he collected, 
and in them he waged war against financiers, tax farmers, and especially foreigners, who 
threatened France and her people with “their malicious schemes, swindles, plots, monopolies, 
cabals, and Jewish ways of dealing (Iuifveries)” (p. 93). Cleirac’s account of the “legend” is an 
“astonishing mix of fact and fiction, a mix that ensured it a long life”: Jews expelled from France 
in waves between the seventh and fourteenth centuries invented marine insurance and bills of 
exchange in order to save their financial assets, and Italian exiles of the factional strife between 
the Guelfs and the Ghibellines availed themselves of the same Jewish techniques and ultimately 
brought them across the Alps to northern Europe (p. 37). The medieval usurer in his many guises—
the Jew, the Lombard, the Cahorsin—transcended, in Cleirac’s account, the divide between the 
Middle Ages and early modernity and proved both “tenacious and malleable” as a means of 
understanding and grappling with anxieties about credit and finance (p. 48). 
In “abbreviated and sanitized form” the “legend” was incorporated into Jacques Savary’s 
1675 Le Parfait négociant, “the single most influential merchant manual of early modern Europe,” 
which guaranteed its diffusion and entry into the canon of commercial literature (pp. 99, 8). A 
wealthy wholesale merchant-mercer (mercier-marchand en gros) from a once noble family, the 
talented and well-connected Savary was a crucial player in a major transformation of French 
commercial culture. Trivellato describes as “nothing less than epochal” one of the reforms initiated 
in the late 1660s by Louis XIV’s famed finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert and drafted by 
Savary because, by subjecting all persons involved in trade to recently formed merchant tribunals, 
it changed commercial law in France “from a personal-status law (ratione personae) into a subject-
matter law (ratione materiae)” (p. 86). “Together,” Trivellato writes, with a rare hint of the 
hyperbolic, “this piece of legislation and Le Parfait négociant laid the legal and cultural 
foundations for a commercial society based on contract rather than rank” (p. 105). Although it is 
not treated in a sustained way in any one place in her book, this transition, writ large and on a 
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societal level, is the profoundest subject matter of Promise and Peril. And although it is not directly 
cited, one cannot but call to mind the (forgivably teleological and procrustean) thesis of Henry 
Maine’s Ancient Law (1861) that, in his famous formulation, the passage “from status to contract” 
in legal regimes marked the passage from ancient to modern societies.  
 
What is at stake in Promise and Peril is not so much those concepts (rank and contract, 
here not especially well defined or theorized, or their various theoretical-historiographical 
synonyms like Niklas Luhmann’s personal trust and system trust) as the passage between them, its 
duration, its abruptness. The notion that Jews in the marketplace (and later in civil society) would 
be treated not as Jews, belonging to a distinct and firmly circumscribed group, but simply as 
merchants, indeed ultimately as equals, still provoked deep anxieties in the seventeenth century 
and even, Trivellato shows, in the late eighteenth century. In the absence of necessary regulations, 
of the sort that Colbert himself (always more distrustful of merchants than Savary) and, later, 
Colbertists increasingly supported, the “legend” itself acted as a kind of shared and internalized 
regulatory mechanism: “the figure of the Jew was essential to the definition of market ethics . . . 
because Jews served as abstract referents that exemplified improper behavior” (p. 120). The 
“legend,” in a way, is thus part of the history of self-regulating commercial society and part of the 
dark prehistory of the self-regulating market. The creation of commercial society in Europe 
(indeed, the creation of modernity) cannot be understood, Trivellato shows, without reckoning 
with these troubling anxieties, and without reincorporating (or incorporating for the first time) the 
history of the Jews fully into the history of the West. The anti-Semitic trope of the Jews as a people 
apart, “a people within a people, a nation within a nation,” has largely been matched by a history 
apart, a historiography apart. Promise and Peril is a clarion call to no longer relegate the history 
of the Jews to the margins of the history of France, of Europe, of commerce, of modernity. 
The most prominent eighteenth-century voice supporting the view with which this review 
essay began (a view that, following his phraseology, has come to be called the doux commerce, or 
“sweet” or “gentle commerce,” thesis) was that of Montesquieu, who made the case for 
commerce’s pacifying, transformational power in his epoch-making 1748 book De l’esprit des 
loix. A version of this view, according to Trivellato, continues to exert a strong influence in the 
field of Jewish studies, both popular and academic, where a faith in “commerce as a driving force 
in the transition from toleration to equality” and in “the Enlightenment trope of commerce as 
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sociability” remains potent (p. 130). In terms of the history of the Jews in France, she notes, this 
belief strengthens the Sephardic/Ashkenazic dichotomy, portraying the Sephardim as savvy and 
socially integrated harbingers of emancipation and the Ashkenazim as isolated remnants of the 
Old World, in, regardless of its intent, yet another manifestation of the long-lived (and, especially 
in the twentieth century, deleterious) trope of Ashkenazic pauperism and backwardness. Purveyors 
of this idea also, Trivellato writes, imply or sometimes even explicitly posit “an invisible link 
connecting Montesquieu’s celebration of Jewish commercial activity . . . to the extension of 
citizenship” to Jews in France in 1790–1791. And Trivellato’s elegant and powerful revisionist 
treatment, in chapter 6 of Promise and Peril, of Montesquieu and French emancipation, is 
undoubtedly the high point of the book, transmuting what is often a difficult and slow rummage 
through the forgotten attics of the history of commercial ideas into truly essential and vibrant 
reading for historians in a whole host of fields, including French history, Jewish history, 
Enlightenment history, and the “new” histories of capitalism and political economy. 
Even before the end of the seventeenth century, the “legend” about the Jewish invention of 
bills of exchange had been refuted (first and on historical grounds by Jacques Dupuis de la Serra, 
in his 1690 L’art des lettres de change, who instead credited exiled Florentine Guelfs, a view that 
not surprisingly achieved some prominence among campanilistic Florentines and Italians more 
broadly) and many of the references to the “legend” in the printed commercial literature were, to 
use Trivellato’s term, “dubious.” (By my count, about 20 percent of the French works and 57 
percent of non-French works mentioning the “legend” by 1800 were dubious.) There was in fact, 
as Trivellato notes, also “an enduring counternarrative” to the “legend,” largely spread by Italian 
and Spanish writers, in which “merchants’ industriousness, not the prodigious talents of one 
refugee group or another” had led to the development of the bill of exchange, which ultimately 
allowed the movement of money and goods to the benefit of humanity. Dupuis de la Serra’s 
refutation marked a first “moment of discontinuity” in the long life of the “legend”; Montesquieu’s 
acceptance and reworking of the “legend” marked a second (p. 113). Montesquieu influentially 
argued that l’esprit de commerce triumphed over the barbarism of the Middle Ages around the 
time of the first European transoceanic voyages and that Jews brought about this triumph:  
The Jews invented letters of exchange; commerce, by this method, became capable of 
eluding violence, and of maintaining every where [sic] its ground; the richest merchant 
having none but invisible effects, which he could convey imperceptibly wherever he 
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pleased. . . . Thus we owe to the speculations of the schoolmen all the misfortunes which 
accompanied the destruction of commerce; and to the avarice of princes, the establishment 
of a practice which puts it in some measure out of their power. . . . From this it became 
necessary, that princes should govern with more prudence, than they themselves could ever 
have imagined. . . . Happy it is for men that they are in a situation, in which, though their 
passions prompt them to be wicked, it is however their interest to be humane and virtuous!” 
(pp. 276–77 of the translation of Thomas Nugent, London, 1793) 
 
No longer did the “legend” serve to distinguish, as it had in Cleirac and Savary, shady (i.e., Jewish) 
dealings from righteous business practices. For Montesquieu, the benighted scholastic theologians 
were the enemies of commerce and the Jews “harbingers of modernity” (p. 134). As a result of the 
threats and depredations of princes against tangible Jewish property, they invented the bill of 
exchange, which, being essentially immaterial, allowed them to “elude” such acts of politicized 
violence; as a result, princes had to learn to govern more prudently, their interests counterbalancing 
and even overcoming their wicked passions. “For Montesquieu, who glorified commercial credit, 
bills of exchange became the antithesis to, rather than the sequel of, the pawnshop” (p. 135). And 
the positive and utterly original—“as novel to eighteenth-century readers as Machiavelli’s 
nonreligious definition of virtù [must have] appeared to readers of The Prince two hundred year 
earlier” (p. 136)—Montesquieuian spin on the “legend” resulted in the “bifurcation” of its 
transmission, with Cleirac and Savary signaling in one direction and Montesquieu in another, even 
though travelers down both roads were convinced of Jewish cunning and viewed Jews more as 
symbols, or as vehicles to articulate concepts, than as equals in the marketplace or the city square 
(p. 139). 
In his controversial and important book on the Enlightenment roots of modern anti-
Semitism, Arthur Hertzberg used Montesquieu as a foil for the anti-Semite Voltaire (The French 
Enlightenment and the Jews [1968]). He “was consistently quoted,” Hertzberg wrote, “by all those 
who were on the side of the Jews” (quoted on p. 143). Yet Montesquieu’s praise of Jews as the 
inventors of a financial instrument beneficial to mankind must be tempered, Trivellato argues, by 
the fact that Montesquieu “assumed that Jews inhabited a society of status that kept them in a 
subordinate position” (p. 131). And, strikingly, though commercial motives had clearly inspired 
the early modern regimes of toleration and of privileges for Jewish merchants (as in Cleirac’s 
 
 8 of 16 
Bordeaux), when emancipation finally emerged as a real possibility in France in the last quarter of 
the eighteenth century “the virtues of commerce were never used as weapons by pro-Jewish 
advocates” (p. 157). This can be explained by routine and newly prominent linkages in the 
discursive tradition of Jews to commerce through the medium of what was then called friponnerie, 
an amorphous mixture of bad faith, conniving, and usury increasingly synonymous with Jewish 
business practices. When emancipation was a real possibility, and Christians and Jews would no 
longer be formally separated, usury became “the symbol of something bigger—namely the 
suspicion that Jews might be unable to partake in civil and political society as fair players” (p. 
159). And tantalizing as it is to draw a bright line from Montesquieu’s revolutionary reading of 
the “legend” to emancipation, the French debates surveyed by Trivellato show that the discursive 
environment surrounding Jewish emancipation was not one in which Jewish ties to commerce were 
praised but one in which the line between Sephardic international merchant-bankers and 
Ashkenazic moneylenders was collapsed and old fears about Jewish invisibility resurfaced. “In 
fact,” Trivellato concludes, “commerce played a minor role, if any at all, in the political 
emancipation of the Jews” (p. 155). Historians of eighteenth-century France and of Jewish 
emancipation will have to grapple with Trivellato’s revisionism and with the blow it deals to 
notions of “gradual” improvement from toleration to emancipation, but there can be no doubt, as 
she argues, that Montesquieu scholarship has been shaped by “a deep investment,” on the part of 
historians, “in the irenic and inclusive quality of doux commerce” and that this legend (doux 
commerce) played an important role (as did the stadial theories of economic development proffered 
by the foremost thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment) in the historical near oblivion of the other 
legend (the Jewish invention of the bill of exchange) (p. 133). 
The final chapter of Promise and Peril, in which Trivellato discusses how “the founders of 
modern social theory” both accepted and rejected the “legend,” is, perhaps unsurprisingly given 
the fraught modern themes it surveys, the book’s weakest and something of a missed opportunity 
(p. 213). It also represents the first time that, in Trivellato’s usually steady hands, the focus on the 
“legend” and on the representation of Jews within Europe’s commercial literature seems to limit 
rather than expand the scope of previous inquiry. Although it ranges over a capacious territory, 
justifying to some extent Trivellato’s caveat that she cannot “provide an equally granular 
description of the historical contexts” involved as she had for earlier chapters, the conceptual heart 
of the chapter, which occasionally devolves into a coy morality play, circles around a discussion 
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of Werner Sombart’s 1911 Die Juden und das Wirstschaftsleben (p. 200). That text laid out a 
narrative, as Trivellato describes it, in which “the Jew . . . with his creative genius” was present at 
every stage in the evolution of credit from a personal to an impersonal matter, including at the 
invention of the bill of exchange (or, more precisely, the moment when it became endorsable and 
negotiable in the sixteenth century) (Sombart quoted on p. 206).  
 
Trivellato pulls no punches: Sombart’s book is “preposterous,” it includes “distorted 
citations and ludicrous statements,” it “pillaged and distorted” then contemporary Jewish 
scholarship, and so on (pp. 206–7). Trivellato, who lists all of the bibliographic citations in Die 
Juden in an appendix to Promise and Peril, seems almost as upset about Sombart’s faulty 
scholarship — it is “far shoddier,” even, “than Weber’s”!—as she is about the “insidious 
fantasies,” which she says his book fueled. Almost. For Sombart, she writes, “capitalism bred 
moral decline, which is why it had a Jewish face” (p. 214). Perhaps more than Sombart himself, 
Trivellato’s target appears to be those in the field of Jewish history who have undertaken a “partial 
rehabilitation” of Sombart’s thesis in Die Juden. Trivellato is right to call this undertaking 
“perplexing,” and she is certainly right that Die Juden should be seen “as a flawed empirical 
account and as a chapter in modern intellectual history” rather than adopted as an “imperfect 
model” (pp. 223–24). But, far from “equally granular,” the context she provides for Sombart, after 
largely leapfrogging much of the nineteenth century, is little more than Wilhelm Roscher’s 1875 
strange essay “Die Stellung der Juden im Mittelalter” and an almost offhand reference to 
Sombart’s “flirtation with fascist ideology” (Arthur Mitzman quoted on p. 223). One parenthetical 
remark—“regardless of whether or not one agrees that Sombart embraced a racial theory of 
Jews”—instead of rhetorically waving it away only calls attention to the iceberg of tumultuous 
debate and interpretation floating beneath the still surface waters of Trivellato’s portrait (p. 215). 
Sombart was seen as an ally by many Zionists—one of his works was even translated by David 
Ben-Gurion in 1911, as Trivellato notes—and nineteenth-century debates about the exclusionary 
nation-state (indeed the ethnic nation-state, and the Jewish state) must be a prime locus of any 
discussion of Sombart and the Jews (p. 379n41). And, we might add, when Sombart, writing for a 
different audience and at a different time in his revised Der moderne Kapitalismus, and looking 
back to a mercantilist era of more or less inclusive empires (even multiethnic ones), explicitly 
addressed the Weber thesis in nuce, he found the burgeoning “spirit of capitalism” not pace Weber 
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in “any definite religious system or any definite sect” but among those whom Sir William Petty 
called “the heterodox parties” and Sombart calls “heretics,” the religious and political 
nonconformists, the migrants, the outsiders, a class that for him is defined in an explicitly relational 
or positional rather than essentialist way and that included in Europe both Jews and ascetic 
Protestants (1928, vol. 1, book 2, chap. 60 [“Die Ketzer”], 880–81, my translation). 
In chapter 8, Trivellato also describes a “revolt of the medievalists” (beginning parallel to 
the one identified by Wallace K. Ferguson with that phrase some seven decades ago, in which 
medievalists like Charles Homer Haskins attacked the modernity of Burckhardt’s Renaissance) 
against the Weberian view that the economy of the Middle Ages was precapitalist. Economic 
historians in the inter- and postwar period, beginning with Henri Pirenne in Belgium—“many (but 
not all) Catholics, and a few flirting with fascism”—pushed the origins of capitalism back to a 
“commercial revolution” occurring in the thirteenth century or even earlier, in urban Italy and in 
the precocious trade of the Italian mediterranean (pp. 198–99). (The term “commercial revolution” 
was coined, in a dialogue with N. S. B. Gras, the first ever professor of business history, by 
Raymond de Roover, then a recent Harvard MBA, who was, for what it’s worth, a Catholic, a 
Belgian monarchist, and a fierce anticommunist—though, as Trivellato herself points out, some of 
these medievalists were also Jews, like Robert S. Lopez, and members of socialist and democratic 
left parties, like Armando Sapori.) Though the medievalists-in-revolt rejected Weber’s chronology 
of the origins of capitalism, Trivellato argues, they did not reject his “Christianization of 
capitalism,” which, in Weber, the sociologist of religions, is a quintessentially Western 
phenomenon while Judaism is an Eastern faith. Instead, she claims, the medievalists “pushed Jews 
to the fringes of medieval urban economies by portraying them as pawnbrokers rather than 
international traders” and they did so, she believes, “as a way of cleansing the stain that any 
associations of capitalism with Jews carried” (pp. 212, 214). Perhaps, but this a bold (and damning) 
argument to make on the basis of silences and lacunae, especially when many of the figures 
Trivellato discusses—Gino Luzzatto (whose papers are at the Università di Venezia Ca’ Foscari), 
Sapori (at the Biblioteca Comunale degli Intronati di Siena), Lopez (at Yale University), et al.—
have left behind voluminous and revealing correspondence, private papers, and annotated books. 
Early on, Trivellato notes that her “interpretive practice is loosely indebted to symptomatic 
reading,” though without the messy “deconstruction, Marxism, and psychoanalysis” that originally 
influenced it, namely to a kind of reading that exhorts the critic to “unveil the latent meanings that 
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lie beneath the surface of a text” (pp. 20, 298–99n3). If the economic historians of Italy who 
justifiably challenged the Weberian chronology of capitalism’s origins failed to speak of Jewish 
international merchants or, say, failed to mention Werner Sombart’s Die Juden (as in the case of 
Amintore Fanfani, whose failure to cite it in his L’opera di Werner Sombart, written for the 
centenary of Sombart’s birth, is mentioned portentously on p. 212) in order to “cleanse the stain” 
of Jewish associations with capitalism, this was apparently happening at a level of latency 
accessible only to symptomatic readers. Promise and Peril is full of “why” questions—for 
example, “Why did Savary endorse the story of the Jewish origin of bills of exchange?”—
questions that admit no direct, clear evidence or for which any such evidence, if it ever existed, is 
no longer extant; these are questions that Trivellato handles with precision and sophistication by 
richly contextualizing them (p. 104). The pioneers of the field of Renaissance economic and 
business history, whose “fertile season of scholarship” was decades long and, in many ways, truly 
pathbreaking, deserve similarly rich contextualization (p. 213). Their “season” was a time when, 
as Trivellato notes, “business history was still integral to the study of the Renaissance,” before the 
American practice of economic history largely “had migrated from history to economics 
departments,” when scholars were steadfastly interested in an economic revolution marked by 
“institutional more than technological change,” and before the center of gravity in the field had 
shifted from preindustrial Italy to industrial England (pp. 218, 219, 21). This world we have lost 
(founded upon a doubtlessly politicized, wider search for the origins of modernity in the Middle 
Ages) cannot be recovered, and reverential silence about these pioneers and their flaws (scholarly 
and otherwise) does nothing other than stifle economic historians in the present, but any 
meaningful and lasting critique must be rigorous and fully informed. Had Trivellato cast a just 
slightly wider net, one that captured other important figures in the medievalists’ revolt like Hilmar 
Krueger, Lopez’s old friend from the University of Wisconsin, who wrote about the medieval 
Genoese trade in the Mediterranean and North Africa in the interwar period, she would have 
rapidly found medieval Jews as bankers and wealthy traders rather than as urban pawnbrokers. 
More to the point, Trivellato’s treatment of both Sombart and the medievalists-in-revolt suggests 
that, at least here, the focus on the Jewish place in economic literature is not finally capacious 
enough to make meaningful sense of either. It was Sombart’s (also shoddy qua scholarship, but 
monumental and visionary) Der moderne Kapitalismus, especially in its revised second edition, 
which Luzzatto partially translated into Italian in 1925, and not his “preposterous” little book on 
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the Jews and economic life, that left a powerful imprint on the medievalists. (A dark irony, alas, is 
that Luzzatto was increasingly forced to take on translation work from German to Italian—
especially of other economic historians and business historians such as Alfred Doren and Richard 
Ehrenberg [whose approach inspired N. S. B. Gras in defining the American contours of business 
history in the late 1920s], sometimes anonymously—because, in his life and career, he was 
painfully suffering under fascist Italy’s anti-Semitic racial laws.) “For a very long time,” Luzzatto 
would accurately write in the introduction to his translation of Sombart, “no work in the historians’ 
field, had had the fortune of stirring up around itself such a fervor of critical and polemical 
writings” (Il capitalismo moderno [1925], 6, my translation). A glimpse of this unparalleled fervor 
and the reasons for it would have gone far in contextualizing Sombart, presenting a more nuanced 
view of his approach to the origins of capitalism (and his was, indeed, a more nuanced approach 
than Weber’s), and in understanding the approach of the medieval revolt to the ethnic and religious 
dimensions of economic history, which, if viewed fairly and fully, is unlikely to be entirely 
reducible to “Christianizing” in order to exorcize capitalism’s Jewish demons. 
Seven appendices (running to nearly seventy pages) and extensive, sometimes fascinating, 
endnotes together constitute an outsized chunk (about 44 percent) of Promise and Peril. The first 
appendix presents an impressionistic and pugnacious survey of the quality, cost, and availability 
of bibliographies and databases of early modern European “commercial literature.” Trivellato 
rightly bemoans the prohibitive expense of proprietary databases like Gale’s Making of the Modern 
World, which contributes to a growing “digital divide” in academia, and she raises the crucial point 
that premodern commercial literature must be a much more capacious (even promiscuous) 
category than the term “economic literature” would suggest still today. The next five appendices 
present a list of Cleirac’s works, English translations of three versions of “the legend” (one from 
the expanded and widely circulated 1661 second edition of Cleirac’s Us et coustumes de la mer, 
one from Jacques Savary’s 1675 Parfait négociant, and one from the 1723 first volume of his son 
Jacques Savary de Brûlons’s Dictionnaire universel de commerce, posthumously completed by 
the latter’s brother Philemon-Louis Savary), and lists of books in French and other languages that 
mention “the legend” up to 1800. The final appendix, as mentioned above, lists the works 
referenced in Sombart’s Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben. Compiling it was surely tedious 
work, and perhaps, at the risk of employing a Catholic metaphor, a kind of penance. The first 
appendix, to which I will return below, should (and could easily) have been reworked to be placed 
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in the text proper and, given Trivellato’s old-fashioned approach (actually reading, rather than 
counting or “data mining” or visualizing), I am unsure of the need for and the value of publishing 
the rest of the lists and translations. Taken together their (perhaps admirable) “kitchen sink” quality 
might outweigh their ponderous lack of sprezzatura, the Renaissance value of making it look easy, 
made famous by Castiglione’s Cortegiano (1528), but without any list-centered analysis in the 
book their presence left this reader bewildered, especially given Trivellato’s characteristic 
lightness of touch in the text of the book. Undoubtedly necessary to write the book but certainly 
not to read it, like Wittgenstein’s famous ladder they should have been thrown away sozusagen 
after being climbed. 
In framing her book, Trivellato downplays the powerful and exciting revisionism at its core 
and opts instead to highlight “three broad historiographical debates on which [her] analysis 
impinges”: rethinking the relation of representation to practice, which I have briefly discussed 
above and in which her book presents a master class; questioning periodization schemes and 
received continuities and ruptures in the historical narrative; and challenging the canon of 
“economic” literature (p. 7). She is, I think, only partially successful in this last area and is 
uncharitable to other scholars who have tried to do the same thing before her. To take one example, 
only half of the authors of the books in Trivellato’s Appendix 6 (non-French books that cite the 
“legend”) can be found in the text (excluding the notes and appendices) of Promise and Peril. 
Taken as a whole, this half is certainly a noncanonical group (few nonspecialists, indeed few 
specialists, will have ever read, for example, Johann Heinrich Zedler or the brothers Ascanio and 
Pompeo Baldasseroni). But about half of these authors appear only once and are not subject to any 
analysis, while many of those who appear more than once are, of course, already more or less 
canonical (Beccaria, Bielfeld, Forbonnais, Genovesi, James Steuart), and just one certifiably 
canonical figure (Montesquieu) appears as much as all the rest combined. This cannot be a 
criticism, for Montesquieu’s role in her story is essential and brilliantly handled, but it is a reminder 
that canons (sometimes for good reasons) are hard to avoid and harder to replace. Similarly, it is 
easy enough to give as much space to Wyndham Beawes (the author of an oft reprinted eighteenth-
century merchant manual) as to William Blackstone or to Steuart, as Trivellato does when she 
discusses the “distant echoes” of the “legend” in England, but canonicity within the field of 
merchant manual writing and canonicity per se are clearly different phenomena. Canonicity 
cannot, Trivellato would agree, be a simple matter of edition counting or readership estimating, 
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and it also cannot, she argues, be the retrospective application of the preferences and fads of our 
own or our forebears’ time, but finding a consistent and compelling route between these options 
is easier said than done. The case of Steuart provides a good example: “Steuart’s treatise on 
political economy,” she writes, “could not compete in originality with the economic writings of 
such giants of his time as Quesnay, Cantillon, Turgot, Hume, and Smith, but it is estimated [by 
Keith Tribe] that outside of Britain, through the 1780s, it was better known and more frequently 
cited than The Wealth of Nations” (p. 172). Some writers are more gigantic, some more original, 
some better known, some more cited, and so on, across a terrain with shifting geographical and 
chronological boundaries. 
The way that Trivellato positions herself in relation to other scholars who have challenged 
the canon of economic literature (or, more accurately, presented alternative canons) is, as such, 
somewhat problematic. She dismisses the list of “economic bestsellers” compiled by Ken 
Carpenter, formerly of Harvard Business School’s Kress Library, who has dedicated much of his 
life to challenging the canons of economic literature from a historical-bibliographic perspective, 
even though Carpenter’s point—that the books we now treat as canonical were not the most read 
in the past—and hers align comfortably. Similarly, she suggests that Sophus Reinert “relied 
entirely” on that (admittedly, indeed intentionally, circumscribed) corpus of texts, when in fact the 
data set he used included around 2,500 translations (Translating Empire [2011], 45), among them 
many merchant manuals. The criteria for inclusion (Carpenter’s ten or more editions; Carpenter-
Reinert’s threshold of explicit theorization; Trivellato’s availability in large, word-searchable 
databases like Gale’s) may differ, and for different purposes, but all bibliographic corpora include 
and exclude certain texts for reasons inextricably tied to the moment of their creation and the 
attitudes of their creators. Looking ahead from the era of Google Books to a rapidly arriving age 
of access-superabundance, moreover, ever more discerning criteria (and the various alternative 
canons they produce) rather than increasingly indiscriminate ones (and the shapeless anticanons 
they produce) may become both more necessary and more valuable than continuing to criticize the 
canons of the access-poor past, ideological though they may have been, that we are exploding in 
the access-rich present. 
In an erudite aside Trivellato notes that, several years before the publication of Cleirac’s 
compendium of sea laws, the Genoese jurist Raffaele della Torre, in his Tractatus de cambiis, had 
metaphorically likened the historical development of financial exchanges (cambia) to “a river 
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formed from a multiplicity of small contributory streams—a metaphor that signaled the 
impossibility of determining with precision where the river originated” (p. 179). Although scholars 
have, of course, learned much since, this metaphor remains compelling, for, as Trivellato notes, 
the best scholarship says that the bill of exchange “went through a long period of incubation and 
incremental evolution” over a period of centuries, from the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century, 
and has no precise or pinpointable origin or originator (p. 21). Like the seventeenth-century jurist, 
Trivellato looks to the natural world for a metaphor of her own for the transmission and 
development of the “legend” over time, and she settles on the topography geologists call Karst, 
which is full of sinkholes and caverns and underground drainage systems and is replete with 
streams that abruptly disappear. “Most [of these] streams continue to flow underground,” she 
notes, “but occasionally, some reemerge and erode the surface” (p. 192). This metaphor makes 
clear what she describes as the “central struggle of her inquiry”—understanding the stable, but, 
over time and in different contexts, incredibly mutable associations of Jews with money in the 
postmedieval Christian discursive tradition—and it more than suggests, distressingly, the 
likelihood that these ideas are still flowing underground only to one day emerge again to erode the 
surface. 
Trivellato’s essential new book is resolutely historical, but it is also (and intentionally, as 
she makes clear in her preface) very much a book of our times, written in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis of 2008, and a book for our times, when anti-Semitism is once again on the rise in 
Europe and the United States, when old conspiracy theories are crowding facts out of the public 
square, and when fears about finance and the paper money economy are again summoning up 
right-wing populism and affecting political change on a grand and frightening scale. Rather than 
the dissonances, it is sometimes the consonances, between the distant past and the uncomfortable 
present, that have a harsh ring, as when Trivellato writes, “Cleirac’s Jews were phantoms of the 
past that allowed his readers to make sense of the present” (p. 48). Is it possible to watch the 
coverage of a figure like George Soros, even in “mainstream” right-wing media outlets like Fox 
News, and not worry that such phantoms are emerging again from underground? In Promise and 
Peril, Trivellato holds out two figures as guiding lights: Jonathan Israel, whose transition to 
emeritus status opened up the position she recently filled at the Institute for Advanced Study, and 
the late Albert O. Hirschman. Israel’s goal, she notes, in his early and groundbreaking work 
European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550–1750 (1985), was to “weave Jewish history into 
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the fabric of European history, not to confine it to a separate sphere” (p. 223). And amid a long 
historiographical silence, it was Hirschman who first resurrected Montesquieu’s discussion of the 
Jewish invention of bills of exchange (and it was from this discussion, as can be seen above, that 
he took the title of his 1977 classic, The Passions and the Interests) in order to argue for 
commerce’s interdependence with democracy and ability to resist (or, as Montesquieu says, to 
“elude”) authoritarian violence. He also, crucially, argued that the received late twentieth-century 
disciplinary (or canonical) boundaries of economics did not exist in the eighteenth century or 
earlier and would have to be passed through or torn down in order to understand the earliest 
“political arguments” for capitalism. In Promise and Peril, an important book deserving the widest 
possible readership across disciplines, Trivellato has shown herself to be the heir of both Israel 
and Hirschman. She has also shown herself as adept at “close and contextual reading” as she was 
with the very different approach and techniques (though in both there is a crucial interplay between 
the small and large scale) of her first English-language book, The Familiarity of Strangers, one of 
the most important business histories of the last four decades, which was based on the enormous 
extant commercial correspondence (more than thirteen thousand letters) of two Sephardic 
merchant families (p. 9). The subject of Familiarity was a firm, and its subject was how trust 
functioned in the global commerce of the eighteenth century. The subject of Trivellato’s new book 
is a forgotten “legend” about medieval Jews, and its subject is nothing less than the making of the 
modern world. 
 
